A real client of Qubera Wealth Management

He was days from signing. The sale would have cost him $156,265.

A retiree, age 72, and the rental house he bought in 1987 for $113,000.

The situation in brief

Client
Retiree, age 72, married, Los Angeles County
Property
Single-family rental, held 39 years
Purchase price
$113,000, of which $70,000 was land
Offer accepted
$675,000, all cash, as-is
Tax exposure on an outright sale
$156,265 federal and California
What we did
1031 exchange into four Delaware Statutory Trusts
Commission rebated to him
$33,845, credited to his investment
Result
$156,265 in taxes deferred, income more than doubled, no management headaches

The situation

He bought the house in 1987 for $113,000, back when a middle-class income could still do that in Los Angeles. For thirty-nine years it did quietly what rental property is supposed to do.

The last fifteen of those years, the same family lived there. He liked them. He never raised the rent much, so by the time he called us they were paying close to what they had paid during the financial crisis. The yard had gone. Maintenance had been let go. He was collecting $21,600 a year in rent, and after property taxes, insurance, mortgage interest and repairs he was netting $8,606, all of it fully taxable on top of his pension.

He was seventy-two and he was done being a landlord. An investor offered him $675,000 in cash, as-is, no contingencies, quick close. Fully remodeled the house would have been worth more, but he did not want to remodel anything. He thought the deal was fair, and it was.

The problem he did not know he had

Nobody had told him what the sale would actually cost.

Thirty-nine years is longer than the 27.5-year depreciation schedule the tax code gives residential rental property. The building had been written off entirely. Only the land was left in his basis, which meant almost the whole sale price was gain.

If he had signed and sold

Sale price$675,000
Less commissions and closing costs($36,067)
Less adjusted basis, land only($70,000)
Taxable gain$568,933
Additional federal income tax$89,967
Net investment income tax$15,349
Additional California tax$50,949
Tax caused by the sale$156,265
What he would have kept
Sale price$675,000
Less commissions and closing costs($36,067)
Less loan payoff($122,333)
Cash before tax$516,600
Less tax($156,265)
Left to reinvest$360,335

What actually happened

Proceeds to the qualified intermediary$497,218
Less exchange funds returned unused($2,218)
Equity invested in four DSTs$495,000
Commission we rebated and credited to him$33,845
His capital at work$528,845
Plus the DSTs' own financing$380,155
Real estate acquired$909,000
Cash he set aside for personal use$22,218
Capital gains tax due this year$0
Depreciation recapture due this year$0
Tax deferred$156,265

We rebated the $33,845 sponsor selling commission and credited it to his investment rather than keeping it, so nearly 7 percent more of his capital reached the real estate than a commissioned placement would have left him. The $22,218 he set aside is $19,333 paid at closing, $667 of California withholding paid on his behalf, and $2,218 of exchange funds returned unused.

Deferred, not erased. The $156,265 is not forgiven. It moves into his new properties and comes due if he ever sells them for cash. What he gained is time. The $156,265 stays invested and working for him instead of going to the government. And under current law, if he holds these investments until he dies, his heirs inherit them at their value on that date. The deferred tax would never be paid by anyone.

He called before signing. That is the whole story.

Had he closed that sale without a qualified intermediary already in place, the 1031 exchange would have been legally unavailable. The intermediary must be engaged before the sale closes, and the proceeds must go from escrow directly to them. There is no way to fix this after the fact. One phone call, made a few days earlier than it had to be, was worth $156,265.

What we did

We set him up with a qualified intermediary immediately, before the closing date, and added exchange language to the purchase agreement. When escrow funded, $497,218 went to the intermediary rather than to him. Had he simply sold, $360,335 would have reached his account after commissions, the loan payoff and the tax. The exchange kept the whole $516,600 working instead.

Within the 45-day identification window, we selected four Delaware Statutory Trusts, each holding institutional-grade multifamily properties in a different market. He invested $495,000 of equity and set aside $22,218 for personal use. He wanted some money in hand, and there was no reason to pretend otherwise.

Cash taken out of an exchange is called boot and is normally taxable. In his case it was not. The $36,067 of commissions and closing costs on the sale exceeded the $22,218 he kept, and under the Form 8824 rules those costs reduce the boot figure. Here they reduced it to zero. That is a specific result on his specific numbers. It is not something to count on before yours has looked at your closing statement.

He contributed $495,000 of equity. We rebated the sponsor selling commission of $33,845 and credited it to his investment rather than keeping it, so $528,845 of his capital went to work in the properties. The DSTs carry their own long-term fixed-rate financing, which added $380,155 of debt and brought the total real estate to about $909,000, a loan-to-value of 42 percent. That leverage also satisfied the debt replacement requirement created by paying off his $122,333 mortgage.

More leverage than he had before

His old property carried $122,333 of debt against $675,000 of value, about 18 percent. The replacement position carries 42 percent, mostly because the exchange rules required him to replace that $122,333 mortgage, and because of the financing already in place on the DSTs available inside his 45-day window. We looked for diversification across sponsor, location, and asset class rather than concentrating in one deal: a mixed-use property in Kansas City, multifamily apartments in Atlanta and Long Island, and senior townhome living in Kissimmee. Leverage adds risk to any investment, a larger loss if the properties underperform, and refinancing risk when the loans mature, so we paid close attention to each sponsor's track record, each loan's rate and term, and each property's debt coverage, to manage that risk as much as it can be managed.

Kansas City
Missouri
Atlanta
Georgia
Long Island
New York
Kissimmee
Florida

Four markets and four sponsors instead of one street in Los Angeles.

What changed for him

Before

Rent received$21,600/yr
Taxes, insurance, interest, repairs($12,994/yr)
Net income$8,606/yr
Tax treatmentFully taxable
Leverage18% loan-to-value
ManagementHis problem

After

Projected distributions$23,270/yr
Expenses he paysNone
Our advisory fee($3,966/yr)
Net cashflow to him$19,304/yr
Expected tax treatmentLargely sheltered early on
Leverage42% loan-to-value
ManagementSomeone else's

The sponsors project distributions of about $23,270 a year. After our advisory fee of $3,966, roughly $19,304 would reach his account, more than double the $8,606 he had been netting as a landlord. The tax character changes as well. Before, every dollar of that $8,606 sat on top of his pension at his highest marginal rate. The fresh depreciation schedule the exchange created on his share of the four properties is expected to shelter most of the distributions in the early years.

What that comparison leaves out. The DSTs carry front-end costs of roughly 8 to 12 percent of the amount invested, so less than $528,845 is actually working in the real estate even after the rebated commission. The leverage rose from 18 percent to 42 percent. That debt was largely required by the exchange rules and by what was available in his 45-day window, not chosen to raise his income. And the distribution is not the same as profit. Depreciation is a paper deduction, so the cash you receive each year is larger than the income you report, often much larger. The untaxed portion is treated as getting your own money back, which lowers your basis in the investment. That is real value, because you keep the cash now. But it is postponement, not forgiveness: a lower basis means a larger gain whenever the properties are sold, with the depreciation portion taxed at 25 percent. Separately, watch whether a sponsor is distributing more than the properties actually earn. Some do, funding the gap from reserves or from the original raise, and that is a genuine warning sign rather than a tax feature.

Distributions are sponsor projections, not guarantees. They have been reduced and suspended in real DST programs, including recently in multifamily offerings underwritten during the low-rate period. He can lose principal. He cannot sell these interests when he chooses, because there is no public market for them, and he should assume the capital is committed for five to ten years. He has no say in how the properties are run.

He also stopped being a landlord, which is the part he actually cared about.

What made this work

  • He called before closing. Everything else was solvable. That was not. See the eight mistakes and all seven requirements.
  • He was honest about wanting some cash. Naming the $22,218 up front let us plan around it instead of discovering it at the closing table.
  • The debt was replaced automatically. The DSTs' built-in leverage handled the $122,333 mortgage payoff without him arranging any financing.
  • He diversified. Four sponsors and four markets instead of one house on one street, with no more than 10 percent of his investable assets behind any single sponsor.
  • He is not planning to sell. If he holds these interests for life, his heirs receive them at market value under current law and the deferred $156,265 is never paid by anyone.
Why we chose this engagement to write about

We picked this one because it shows the timing problem more clearly than anything else in our files. He was days away from a closing that would have made the exchange impossible. That is the mistake we most want owners to avoid, and it is the part of this story that applies to everyone.

It is not the only 1031 exchange we have handled and it is not offered as a typical outcome. Results depend on the property, the basis, the state, the client's other income, and which offerings happen to be available during the 45 days. Some exchanges deliver less than this one did. If you want to hear how other clients' exchanges have gone, including ones where distributions came in below projection, ask on a call and we will tell you.

What this case study is and is not

This describes one real client's actual experience, anonymized to protect his identity. It is not typical, not a projection of your result, and not a promise of what any other investor will experience. The tax figures were computed from his closing statement and his tax return. Distribution figures are sponsor projections that can be reduced or suspended. DST interests are illiquid, carry front-end costs, use leverage, and principal is at risk. Tax outcomes depend entirely on individual circumstances. Nothing here is tax or legal advice, and you should confirm your own numbers with your own CPA before you act.

Does your situation look like his?

If you have a long-held rental, an offer on the table, and a growing suspicion that the tax is going to be worse than you thought, that is exactly the call to make this week.

Book a free 30-minute call